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Abstract
This study examines the interrelation between small traders’ open inter-
est and large hedging and speculation in the Canadian dollar, Swiss franc,
British pound, and Japanese yen futures markets. The results, based on
Granger-causality tests and vector autoregressive models, suggest that
small traders’ open interest is closely related to large speculators’ open
interest. Small traders and speculators tend to herd, which means that
small traders are long [short] when speculators are long [short] as well.
Moreover, small traders and speculators are positive feedback traders
whereas hedgers are contrarians. Regarding information ﬂows, specu-
lators lead small traders in three of the four currency futures markets.
The results therefore suggest that small traders are small speculators
who follow the large speculators, indicating that they are less well in-
formed than the large speculators.
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11 Introduction
With respect to empirical research on the performance of futures markets, Peck
(1982, p. 181) describes the Commitment of Traders (COT) reports provided by
the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) as “[...] potentially a verita-
ble gold mine of information [...]” with one major limitation. Certainly the COT
reports allow for a detailed analysis of the distribution between speculative and
hedging positions in futures markets, which functions as a signal for the perfor-
mance and stability of futures markets.1 However, the limitation pointed out by
Peck (1982) regards the fact that small (non-reporting) traders are not classiﬁed
as either speculative or hedging. Since the proportion of large traders generally
varies over time and among markets, the relation between open interest of large
speculators and large hedgers may not be representative of the distribution of total
open interest in the market. Especially in markets with signiﬁcant involvement of
small traders, analyzing positions of large traders in isolation may not yield ade-
quate results regarding the overall speculative activity in these markets (Chatrath
and Song, 1999). One suggestion on how to deal with this problem is to estimate
a lower and an upper bound of speculative activity (Working, 1960; Larson, 1961;
Rutledge, 1977; Peck, 1980). Classifying all small traders as speculators [hedgers]
gives an upper [lower] bound of speculative activity.
More recent research suggests viewing small traders as a third category of traders.
Wang (2002a, 2003) argues that small traders are liquidity traders because no clear-
cut patterns of trading activity are visible. Stein and Hong (1990) ﬁnd that large
traders have superior forecasting ability compared to small traders. In contrast, Tao
and Song (2010) report that small traders are not uninformed and play a signiﬁcant
role in the price discovery in the Hang Seng index markets. Hence, empirical results
on how to classify small traders have basically been inconclusive. The discussion
of whether small traders are speculators, hedgers or whether they represent a third
category of traders is still not settled.
1The results of Stein and Hong (1990), Wang (2002a) and Tao and Song (2010)
are all based on an analysis of how information is incorporated into prices. Their ap-
proaches therefore represent an indirect way of analyzing information ﬂows between
traders. In contrast, the present study directly analyzes the connection between
these types of traders by estimating Granger-causality and pairwise vector autore-
gression (VAR) models for the respective open interest in short and long Canadian
dollar, Swiss franc, British pound, and Japanese yen futures contracts. The present
study therefore follows the advice of Working (1960, p. 190), who argues that “[...]
we need to study the statistics of open contracts in order to learn the extent of
connection between hedging and speculation.”
The contribution of this study is threefold. First, the empirical results suggest
that long [short] trading activity of small traders is closely related to long [short]
speculative and short [long] hedging activity, suggesting that small traders are spec-
ulators. These results support earlier ﬁndings regarding herding behavior among
speculators, as well as economic theory which states that long [short] hedging at-
tracts short [long] speculation and vice versa (Keynes, 1930; Hicks, 1939; Working,
1953). Second, the analysis of the reactions of traders’ long and short positions
to futures returns leads to the conclusion that small traders and speculators are
positive feedback traders whereas hedgers are contrarians. This ﬁnding holds true
for all futures markets examined, supporting the previous ﬁnding that small traders
are speculators. Third, Granger-causality test results indicate that large speculators
lead small speculators in three of the four markets. This ﬁnding points to asymmet-
ric information between large and small speculators, and to information ﬂows from
large to small speculators.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The second section presents
the data and introductory statistics. The third section analyzes the relations be-
tween the trading positions of small traders, speculators and hedgers. The fourth
section investigates traders’ reactions to futures returns. The ﬁfth section discusses
information ﬂows between large and small speculators. Finally, the sixth section
2provides the conclusions.
2 Data and introductory statistics
This investigation is conducted with respect to four currency futures contracts traded
at the Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME), the Canadian dollar (CAD), Swiss franc
(CHF), British pound (GBP), and Japanese yen (JPY) from 6 October 1992 to 2
March 2010. The interval was chosen because weekly Commitment of Traders (COT)
data are not available prior to October 1992. The COT reports are compiled by the
Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC). The reports provide information
on the open interest of large hedgers (commercial traders), large speculators (non-
commercial traders) and small traders (non-reporting traders).2 The commercial
and non-commercial trader classiﬁcation is given to traders whose futures positions
exceed the CFTC reporting levels (400 contracts for currencies as of 1 April 2009).3
Small traders’ positions do not exceed the reporting levels and are not classiﬁed as
either hedging or speculation.
Figure 1 shows the distribution of total open interest in long and short futures
contracts. Hedgers dominate all markets almost over the entire time interval. Graph-
ical inspection suggests that the open interest of small traders exceeds the open in-
terest of large speculators quite regularly. For example, regarding the British pound
long futures contract, small traders’ open interest exceeded 50% of total open inter-
est in October 2002. A further ﬁnding regarding Figure 1 is that the open interest
of small traders appears to be more closely related with that of large speculators
rather than with that of large hedgers. In times when hedging activity dominates,
both small traders’ and large speculators’ open interest are rather low (e.g. CHF-
Long from about 2005 to 2007). In contrast, if large speculators are very active then
small traders’ open interest increases as well (e.g. CHF-Long from about 2001 to
2004). This ﬁnding supports earlier results by Wang (2002a) who argues that while
hedgers and speculators tend to move in opposite directions, the trading of small
3traders and speculators moves in the same direction.
The empirical investigation employs changes (i.e. ﬁrst diﬀerences) in open in-
terest of long speculators (SL), short speculators (SS), long hedgers (HL), short
hedgers (HS), long small traders (SML), and short small traders (SMS). Sum-
mary statistics and results of unit root tests are presented in Table 1. In addition to
changes in open interest, Table 1 also reports summary statistics for futures returns
R which are deﬁned as Rt = log(Pt/Pt−1) with Pt the futures settlement price at
time t. The stationarity of the series are checked using both the augmented Dickey
Fuller (ADF) and Kwiatkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin (KPSS) tests. If the ADF test
rejects the null hypothesis of nonstationarity while the KPSS test fails to reject the
null hypothesis of stationarity, then there is strong evidence in favor of a stationary
process. This joint testing approach, called conﬁrmatory analysis because the KPSS
test is used to conﬁrm the results of the ADF test, gives the most reliable results if
both tests indicate that the series are stationary.4 The joint testing results presented
in Table 1 suggest that all series are stationary.
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 1: Large speculators (black), large hedgers (dark gray), and small traders























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































63 The relations between large and small traders
In order to investigate the interrelations between large and small traders the follow-
ing hypotheses are formed:
H1: If small traders are speculators, then there is a causality between
long [short] hedging positions and short [long] positions of small traders.
H2: If small traders are speculators, then there is a causality between
long [short] speculative positions and long [short] positions of small
traders.
H3: If small traders are hedgers, then there is a causality between long
[short] speculative positions and short [long] positions of small traders.
H4: If small traders are hedgers, then there is a causality between long
[short] hedging positions and long [short] positions of small traders.
Hypotheses H1 and H3 are based on the assumption that hedgers and speculators
are generally on opposite sides of the futures market. These hypotheses correspond
to the Keynesian view that if hedgers are net short, speculators should ﬁll the gap
and be net long to restore equilibrium. By reacting to hedgers’ needs, speculators
should earn a risk premium (Keynes, 1930; Hicks, 1939). However, hypotheses
H1 and H3 also correspond to the competing theory that hedgers prefer highly
liquid markets, and therefore markets with a high proportion of speculative activity
(Working, 1953; R¨ othig, 2010). According to this theory, markets with long [short]
speculative activity will attract hedgers to open short [long] positions.
Hypotheses H2 and H4 are based on the assumptions that traders may herd,
which means that their trades are not independent but correlated (Kaldor, 1939;
Nofsinger and Sias, 1999; R¨ othig and Chiarella, 2007). Herding may result because
of both fundamental and non-fundamental factors. Fundamental factors include the
arrival of new information, for example macroeconomic news, to which traders react
in a similar way. Non-fundamental factors include technical analysis and chartism
7(Manzan and Westerhoﬀ, 2007; Westerhoﬀ, 2008). If diﬀerent speculators apply
similar trading rules, then their trades will be correlated. While there are numerous
studies on herding behavior of speculators, there is rarely any literature dealing
with correlated trades of hedgers. Here, the reasoning is similar to the previous
one regarding the interactions of speculators. First, hedgers may react similarly
to fundamental factors. In addition, also non-fundamental factors apply here. If
hedgers use similar hedging and risk assessment models, they will follow common
signals and therefore trade in parallel.
Table 2: Granger-causality tests.
Panel A: Test results for hypotheses H1 and H2
Pair CAD CHF GBP JPY
SL → SML 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
SS → SMS 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
HL → SMS 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
HS → SML 0.0083 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Panel B: Test results for hypotheses H3 and H4
Pair CAD CHF GBP JPY
SL → SMS 0.9832 0.0139 0.1958 0.3622
SS → SML 0.1203 0.0000 0.0002 0.0005
HL → SML 0.0000 0.2237 0.3804 0.4985
HS → SMS 0.0003 0.1541 0.1269 0.0850
Notes: X → Y : p-value for the null hypothesis that X does not Granger-cause Y .
Hypotheses H1 to H4 are examined in a lead-lag framework using Granger-
causality tests and impulse response functions based on vector autoregression mod-
els. The results presented in Panel A of Table 2 suggest that there is a signiﬁcant
relation between the trading activity of long [short] speculators and long [short]
small traders. In addition, there is a signiﬁcant relation between short [long] posi-
tions of hedgers and long [short] positions of small traders. These ﬁndings support
hypotheses H1 and H2, and therefore suggest that small traders are speculators. In
8contrast, the results in Panel B of Table 2 are mixed, and do not point to small
traders being hedgers. Overall, these results suggest that small traders are specula-
tors. Moreover, since long [short] speculation Granger causes long [short] activities
of small traders, the results point to herding activities among large and small spec-
ulators. However, if large speculators and small traders herd, then an increase of
large speculators’ trading activity in long [short] futures contracts should lead to
an increase of small traders’ trading activity in long [short] futures contracts. This
is analyzed using impulse response functions based on vector autoregression (VAR)
models. The bivariate VAR model, where there are two variables, Xt and Yt, is
expressed as follows:













b2iXt−i + ε2t (1)
where n represents the number of lags and εjt are the error terms with j = 1,2.
The number of lags of the bivariate VAR models, which are determined using the
minimum value of the Akaike, Hannan-Quinn, and Schwartz information criteria,
are presented in parentheses in Figures 2 to 7. The impulse response function
labeled X → Y represents the response of Y to a Cholesky one standard deviation
innovation in X.5 Figures 2 to 7 present the eﬀects of a shock in X upon Y over a
time period of ten weeks.
Figure 2 corresponds to hypotheses H1 and H2 (Panel A of Table 2) and Figure 3
corresponds to hypotheses H3 and H4 (Panel B of Table 2). Each of the 16 impulse
response functions presented in Figure 2 suggests that an increase in large specula-
tors’ long [short] and large hedgers’ short [long] positions leads to an increase of small
traders’ long [short] positions for about one or two periods (i.e. weeks), supporting
hypotheses H1 and H2. More precisely, the results point to herding activities among
9large speculators and small traders and the results suggest that long [short] hedgers
attract short [long] small traders to open positions in the futures market. These
ﬁndings clearly suggest that small traders are speculators. In contrast, the impulse
response functions presented in Figure 3 do not show positive responses of small
traders’ long [short] trading activity to increases in long [short] hedging and short
[long] speculation. A further interesting ﬁnding, supporting hypotheses H1 and H2,
is the following. Regarding the ﬁndings in Panel B of Table 2, the most signiﬁcant
causality presented refers to the relation between short speculation and long posi-
tions of small traders. In three out of four cases the Granger-causality test results
are highly signiﬁcant (CHF, GBP, JPY ), and the corresponding impulse responses
shown in Figure 3 are negative. This result supports the herding assumption stated
in hypothesis H2. Hence, not only does an increase in short speculation lead small
traders to increase their short positions (Figure 2), but also to decrease their long














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































124 Traders’ positions and futures returns
This section is concerned with the reactions of traders to futures returns. We for-
mulate the following hypotheses:
H5: If small traders are speculators, then their reactions to futures re-
turns should resemble those of large speculators.
H6: If small traders are hedgers, then their reactions to futures returns
should resemble those of large hedgers.
These hypotheses are again analyzed using vector autoregression models. Figures
4 to 7 present the responses of traders’ long and short positions to an increase
in futures returns. The results clearly support hypothesis H5, and therefore the
previous ﬁndings that small traders are speculators. The reactions of small traders
to a shock in futures returns are very similar to those of speculators, but quite
diﬀerent to those of hedgers. Small traders and large speculators increase [decrease]
their long [short] positions after an increase in returns in all markets investigated.
Hence, small traders and speculators are positive feedback traders. In contrast,
hedgers decrease [increase] their long [short] positions after an increase in returns,
and therefore act like contrarians. Hence, the results do not support hypothesis H6.
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Figure 4: CAD: Eﬀect of returns on long and short trading activity. The number
of lags of the bivariate VAR models, which are determined using Akaike, Hannan-
Quinn, and Schwartz information criteria, are presented in parentheses.




























1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10


























1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Figure 5: CHF: Eﬀect of returns on long and short trading activity. The number
of lags of the bivariate VAR models, which are determined using Akaike, Hannan-
Quinn, and Schwartz information criteria, are presented in parentheses.
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Figure 6: GBP: Eﬀect of returns on long and short trading activity. The number
of lags of the bivariate VAR models, which are determined using Akaike, Hannan-
Quinn, and Schwartz information criteria, are presented in parentheses.
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Figure 7: JPY: Eﬀect of returns on long and short trading activity. The number
of lags of the bivariate VAR models, which are determined using Akaike, Hannan-
Quinn, and Schwartz information criteria, are presented in parentheses.
155 Information ﬂows between large and small spec-
ulators
Assume, based on the previous ﬁndings, that small traders are speculators. The
question of whether small speculators are less well informed than large speculators
has often been raised in the literature. This section examines the information ﬂow
between large and small speculators in a lead-lag environment. Again, we formulate
a hypothesis:
H7: If small speculators are less well informed than large speculators,
then there should be a unidirectional causality running from large specu-
lators’ positions to small speculators’ positions, rather than bidirectional
causality.
The results presented in Table 2 show that large speculators’ activities Granger-
cause small traders’ positions. Table 3 shows the results for the causality running
from small traders’ to large speculators’ positions. The ﬁndings suggest that, in the
case of CAD and JPY , small traders do not inﬂuence large speculators. Hence,
small traders in CAD and JPY futures markets follow the large speculators, sup-
porting the view that information runs from large to small speculators, and not
vice versa. The results for the GBP futures market are mixed. The short positions
of small traders impact the short positions of large speculators. Although there is
bidirectional causality, the impact of large speculators on small speculators is more
signiﬁcant than the eﬀect of small speculators on large speculators. In the case
of the CHF futures market, there exists bidirectional causality for both long and
short positions. And, at least for the short positions, the results suggest similar
levels of signiﬁcance. These ﬁndings suggest that small speculators active in short
CHF futures markets are not led by large speculators, and are therefore not less
well informed. Summarizing, the information ﬂow runs from large speculators to
the small ones, supporting the view that small speculators are less well informed
16than large speculators, except in the CHF futures market.
Table 3: Granger-causality between small traders’ and speculators’ positions
Pair CAD CHF GBP JPY
SML → SL 0.4701 0.0142 0.1043 0.4372
SMS → SS 0.3498 0.0003 0.0142 0.4805
Notes: X → Y : p-value for the null hypothesis that X does not Granger-cause Y .
6 Conclusions
This study uses Granger-causality tests and vector autoregression models to examine
the relations between small non-reporting traders and large speculators and hedgers
in four currency futures markets. The results are based on both the causal relation-
ships between the open positions of small traders, speculators and hedgers, and the
reaction of traders’ positions to futures settlement price returns. In addition, the
study analyzes the information ﬂow between large and small traders’ and hence the
question of whether large traders are better informed than small traders.
The ﬁndings of the paper are threefold. First, the activities of small traders in
the Canadian dollar, Swiss Franc, British pound, and Japanese yen futures markets
are closely related to those of the large speculators. Large speculators and small
traders tend to herd, that is small traders are long [short] when large speculators
are long [short] as well. In addition, long [short] hedging activity attracts small
traders to open positions in short [long] futures contracts. These ﬁndings support
the view that small traders are speculators. The second main ﬁnding regards the
reaction of traders’ positions to futures returns. The impulse responses of traders’
positions to futures returns suggest that speculators and small traders are positive
feedback traders whereas hedgers are contrarians. Again, these results support the
17previous ﬁndings that small traders are speculators. The third main ﬁnding regards
the information ﬂows between large and small speculators. The results point to
small speculators being less well informed than large speculators in the Canadian
dollar, British pound, and Japanese yen futures markets. However, the bidirectional
causality found in the Swiss franc futures market suggests that small traders are not
per se uninformed. It is necessary to check the information ﬂow in each individual
case.
18Notes
1Leuthold (1983, p. 113) puts it bluntly: “Without hedging, futures markets would close.”
This conclusion is consistent with the ﬁndings of Working (1960, p. 189) who stresses that “[...]
markets [...] have died because hedgers stopped using them.” See also Working (1954), Gray (1967),
Adrangi and Chatrath (1998), Wang (2002b) and Chatrath, Song and Adrangi (2003).
2The CFTC also reports the positions of spreaders. However, spreaders frequently account for
less than 1% of total open interest and are therefore omitted in this investigations.
3The CFTC classiﬁes a trader’s position as commercial if the trader uses the futures contracts for
hedging. The CFTC Regulation 1.3(z), available at www.cftc.gov, says that “[...] no transactions
or positions shall be classiﬁed as bona ﬁde hedging unless their purpose is to oﬀset price risks
incidental to commercial cash or spot operations and such positions are established and liquidated
in an orderly manner [...]”. The CFTC may re-classify a trader if it obtains additional information
about the trader’s use of the futures contracts.
4See Maddala and Kim (1998) for more information on conﬁrmatory analysis.
5For more information on VAR models and impulse response functions see L¨ utkepohl (1991)
and Hamilton (1994).
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